A vanishing silhouette: Acts of state doctrine(s) and interim relief In Singapore by MOHAN, Mahdev
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
3-2016
A vanishing silhouette: Acts of state doctrine(s) and
interim relief In Singapore
Mahdev MOHAN
Singapore Management University, mahdevm@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Law Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
MOHAN, Mahdev. A vanishing silhouette: Acts of state doctrine(s) and interim relief In Singapore. (2016). JOURNAL OF EAST
ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. 9, (1), 234-251. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1942
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 9 J. E. Asia & Int'l L. 234 2016 
Provided by: 
 
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Mon Apr 17 21:55:06 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Published in Cortex, 2016 February, Volume 85, Issue 2, Pages 173-184
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2004.12.003
Published in Journal of East Asia and International Law, 2016 March, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 234-251
234 singapore
SINGAPORE
A Vanishing Silhouette:
Acts of State Doctrine(s) and
Interim Relief In Singapore
Mahdev Mohan*
1. Introduction
This digest examines the intersection between the act of State doctrine, and the
power of Singapore courts under Singapore's International Arbitration Act ("IAA")
to grant interim relief. It is well settled that this private international law doctrine
can be applied by courts at common law when they examine purported sovereign
acts of a foreign government to decide on whether they ought to assume or decline
jurisdiction.
Put differently, the act of State doctrine limits, for prudential reasons, the
forum court from inquiring into the validity of a recognised foreign government's
public acts committed within the latter's own territory.' Whether or not the act
of State doctrine applies is typically considered at the outset of judicial or arbitral
proceedings as it is question of jurisdiction that the court or tribunal ought to
answer first, before determining the substantive merits of the application. However,
in Maldives Airports Co Ltd and another v GMR Malg International Airport Pte Ltd
(hereinafter Maldives Airports),2 principles relevant to the doctrine seem to have been
applied in the Singapore Court of Appeal's ("CA") analysis as to whether or not an
injunction should be granted under the SIIA, even though the CA expressly held
that the doctrine did not apply to preclude its competence because the dispute was a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University School of Law; Nominated Member of Parliament.
LL.B.(NUS), J.S.M. (Stanford). The author is grateful for the research assistance of Kexian Ng, Jaya Anilkumar and
Amber Estad. He may be contacted at: mahdevm@smu.edu.sg
I 'WestLB AG'[2012] 4 SLR 894, at T39.
2 [2013] 2 SLR 449.
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private one, with each party seeking private law remedies.
Significantly, the CA's eventual refusal to grant the injunction was in part based
on the practical problems it had perceived in enforcing and policing the injunction,
particularly where third parties were involved. The author asks if the CA's decision
effectively re-introduced elements of the act of State doctrine under a different
guise. It posits that interim relief in support of arbitration should acknowledge that
disputes, and thus the evidence and assets underlying them, can have both private
and public dimensions. [Emphasis added]
After all, the complexity of this doctrine has prompted the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales to refer to it not as one doctrine, but several rolled into one. In
Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Coys (hereinafter Yukos Capital), Rix L held
the act of State doctrine(s) should not be defined purely by their pre-conditions (to
which there can exist exceptions), but perhaps by their limitations:'
We think that on the whole we prefer to speak of "limitations" rather than "exceptions".
The important thing is to recognise that increasingly in the modem world the doctrine is
being defined, like a silhouette, by its limitations, rather than to regard it as occupying
the whole ground save to the extent that an exception can be imposed.
His Honour added as follows:
In our judgment, the act of state doctrines cannot be reduced to a single formula such
as the judge adopted (distinguishing validity from all other forms of lawful conduct)
or such as Mr Pollock has sought to reformulate on this appeal. Such formulae accord
with neither the English nor the US jurisprudence. On the contrary, we consider that
the act of state doctrines ultimately reflect more complex considerations, and would
refer to the analysis in this court in Kuwait Airways v. Iraqi Airways concluding in its
[317]-[323].'
3 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at In 32-52.
SId, at I 66-71.
5 [201313 WLR 1329.
6 The English Court of Appeal in Yukos Capital identified five exceptions to the act of State doctrine: 1. The act of
state must, generally speaking, take place within the territory of the foreign State itself; 2. The doctrine will not apply
to foreign acts of state which are in breach of clearly established rules of international law, or are contrary to English
principles of public policy, as well as where there is grave infringement of human rights; 3. Judicial acts will not be
regarded as acts of State for the purposes of the act of state doctrine; 4. As a matter of general international law, there
is no immunity for the state's commercial activities; 5. The act of State doctrine was not involved where the only issue
was whether certain acts had occurred, not whether they were invalid or wrongful.
Yukos Capital [2013] 3 WLR 1329, atI 115. [Emphasis added]
Kuwait Airways Corporation v IraqiAirways (Nos. 4 and 5) [2002] AC 883. [Emphasis added]
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In Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways (Nos. 4 and 5),' the House of Lords
articulated three 'insights' which are relevant to the act of State doctrine:
1. The doctrine is primarily founded on the comity of nations;
2. Regardless of whether the sovereign acts within its own territory or outside it, there
is a certain class of sovereign act which calls for judicial restraint on the part of
national courts; and
3. This is the principle of non-justiciability, which seeks to distinguish inter-State
disputes involving sovereign authority from private disputes which can be resolved
by national courts; and subject to certain exceptions, judicial restraint is only a prima
facie rule.
This digest suggests that, regardless of that Court's decision and perhaps intention,
the CA in Maldives Airports is illustrative of the point made in Yukos Capital and
Kuwait Airways Corporation: i.e. the act of State doctrine cannot, and indeed should
not, be reduced into a singular conception. The doctrine, and the question of whether
alleged conduct is non-justiciable, may be able to take various forms, including
being part of an analysis of a seemingly disparate issue, such as the substantive
considerations surrounding the granting of an interim injunction.
2. Facts
In a concession agreement, the appellants, Maldives Airports Company Limited
("MACL") and the Republic of the Maldives (hereinafter Maldives Government),
granted a consortium a 25 year concession to rehabilitate, expand, modernise and
maintain the MalI International Airport (hereinafter the Airport)."
MACL is a company wholly owned by the Maldives Government." The consortium
subsequently incorporated the respondent, GMR Mald International Airport Private
Limited ("GMIA") and novated all its rights and obligations under the concession
agreement to GMIA.12 However, in an action commenced in Maldives Government,
the Maldives civil court had issued a judgment declaring that clauses 2(a) and 2(b)
9 Id.
1o Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at f I & 3.
1 Id. at T 1.
12 Id at TT 1 & 3.
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of the concession agreement, which entitled GMIA to impose fees on departing
passengers, were contrary to a piece of Maldivian legislation as such fees had not
been approved by the Maldivian Parliament (hereinafter Maldivian Judgment).
In order to ensure that the project could continue, the Maldives Government agreed
to deduct the amount of concession fees that GMIA was supposed to pay MACL
resulting in a dramatic fall in revenue that it was supposed to receive." Protests led
to the resignation of former Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed on February
7, 2012. Five days after the next administration came to power on April 14, 2012, it
declared that the former government's agreement to deducting the concession fees
payable by GMIA was issued without requisite authority, and sought to recover
these fees. Notwithstanding these developments, GMIA continued to operate the
agreement on the basis that it was entitled to take into account the loss of income
arising from the Maldives Judgment in calculating fees payable to the Maldivian
Government.
Two separate arbitrations were then commenced in an effort to resolve this dispute.
The first arbitration was commenced on July 5, 2012 by GMIA against MACL and
the Maldives Government seeking, among other things, a declaration that it was
entitled to adjust the fees payable to MACL. Subsequently, on November 27, 2012,
MACL and the Maldives Government each notified GMIA that following the
Maldives Judgment, the concession agreement was void ab initio or, alternatively,
had been frustrated. MACL and the Maldives Government gave GMIA only seven
days to vacate the airport failing which they intimated they would take the airport
over.
On November 29, 2012, MACL and the Maldives Government then commenced
the second arbitration against GMIA seeking a declaration that the concession
agreement was void and had no effect. To prevent the concession agreement from
being prematurely terminated, GMIA filed and obtained an injunction from the
Singapore High Court under Section 12A of the IAA ' restraining MACL, the Maldives
Government, and their directors, officers, servants or agents from interfering
either directly or indirectly with GMIA's performance of its obligations under the
concession agreement.
On appeal by MACL and the Maldives Government, the main issue before the
CA was whether a Singapore court should grant an interim injunction to restrain
" Id. at 4.
14 Id. at 4.
'5 Cap. 143A, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing., Section 12A of International Arbitration Act, which relates to Court-ordered interim
measures.
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MACL and the Maldives Government from interfering with GMIA's operation
of the airport pursuant to the Concession Agreement until the arbitration was
determined.16 Two sub-issues that followed from this were: (1) whether a Singapore
Court has the power to grant an injunction against the government of a foreign
sovereign State; and (2) if it had such a power, whether the injunction should
be granted or upheld given the circumstances. With regard to competence or
jurisdictional challenges, the CA held that it was able to determine the injunction
substantively no such barriers applied. In the Court's opinion, the jurisdictional
barrier of State immunity did not apply as the dispute resolution clause in clause
23 of the concession agreement is sufficient to constitute written consent for the
purposes of s 15(3) of the State Immunity Act ("SIA").s Further, it held that the act
of State doctrine did not apply as the acts were part of a dispute which was of an
entirely private nature and MACL and the Maldives Government were seeking
private law remedies. 9
In setting aside the injunction, the CA held that the Singapore courts have
the power to grant the injunction sought for under s 12A(4) of the IAA. In this
regard, GMIA did not have any contractual rights that could be protected as their
contractual rights were not those which, if lost, would not adequately be remediable
by an award of damages.20 However, it had an interest in the land on which the
airport was situated conferred under a lease that was conferred by the concession
agreement; and this interest was an asset capable of being preserved.2' In addition,
the CA held that the balance of convenience ultimately lay in not granting the
injunction."
3. Waiver of State Immunity
The doctrine of State immunity, which states that a foreign sovereign is immune
to the jurisdiction of other national courts and may not be made a party to legal
16 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at ¶ 11.
17 Id.at 12.
18 Id. at% 17-22.
19 Id at % 23-31.
20 Id. at In 32-52.
21 Id.
22 Id. at IT 53-80.
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proceedings against its will, is a principle enshrined in Singapore law. 3 This
doctrine was first recognised as forming part of Singapore's common law24 and was
subsequently codified under s 3 of the SIA.2
In Maldives Airports, the CA held that s 15(2) of the SIA ordinarily prohibits the
courts from granting injunctive relief against a state.26 However, it opined that clause
23 of the concession agreement was sufficient to constitute waiver of State immunity
under s 15(3) of the SIA.27 Clause 23 states:
To the extent that any of the Parties may in any jurisdiction claim for itself ...
immunity from service of process, suit, jurisdiction, arbitration ... or other legal or
judicial process or other remedy ... , such Party hereby irrevocably and unconditionally agrees
not to claim and hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waives any such immunity to the
fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction. [Emphasis added]
In this regard, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument put forward by counsel for
MACL and the Maldives Government given that it was their case that the whole
concession agreement and accordingly clause 23 was void.28 This was attributed to
two reasons. First, it held that this argument required it to proceed on the basis that
the concession agreement was void ab inito, which was the very issue which is being
contested by the parties in the second arbitration.29 Second, the CA was of the view
23 Republic of the Philippines v Maler Foundation and others (Philippines v. Maler) [2008] 2 SLR(R) 857, at 1 33.
24 See, e.g., Philippines v Maler [2008] 2 SLR(R) 857, at 133.
25 Cap. 313, 1987 Rev. Ed. Sing., s. 3(1): 'A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore except as
provided in the following provisions of this Part.'
26 Cap. 313, 1987 Rev. Ed. Sing., s. 15(2) is as follows:
"Subject to subsections (3) and (4):
(a) relief shall not be given against a State by way of injunction or order for specific performance or for the
recovery of land or other property; and
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration
award or, in an action in rem, for its arrest, detention or sale.'
27 Cap. 313, 1987 Rev. Ed. Sing., s. 15(2) and (3) are as follows:
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4):
(a) relief shall not be given against a State by way of injunction or order for specific performance or for the
recovery of land or other property; and
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement of a judgment or an
arbitration award or, in an action in rem, for its arrest, detention or sale.
(3) "Subsection (2) does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any process with the written
consent of the State concerned; and any such consent (which may be contained in a prior agreement)
may be expressed so as to apply to a limited extent or generally; but a provision merely submitting to the
jurisdiction of the courts is not to be regarded as a consent for the purposes of this subsection."
2 Maldives Airports [201312 SLR 449, at IM 19-21.
29 Id. at 119.
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that clause 23 was severable and parties intended it, as part of the dispute resolution
mechanism, to be enforceable even in situations where the concession agreement
was alleged to be void. " Notably, whilst the CA formed the view that MACL and
the Maldives Government had waived immunity under s 15(3) of the SIA, in this
author's opinion, it could have similarly reached this conclusion under s 11 of the
SIA, which states:
Arbitrations
11. (1) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, or
may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the courts
in Singapore which relate to the arbitration. [Emphasis added]
(2) This section has effect subject to any contrary provision in the arbitration
agreement and does not apply to any arbitration agreement between States.
Whilst s 11 of the SIA may similarly constitutes a waiver, it operates differently from
s 15(3) of the SIA. Unlike s 15(3) which constitutes a waiver specific to the court's
power to grant injunctive relief under s 15(2) of the SIA, s 11 of the same constitutes
a general waiver such that the Singapore Courts are conferred jurisdiction over the
entire "proceedings in the courts in Singapore which relate to the arbitration," as
mentioned therein. As such, s 11 of the SIA is broader than s 15(3) of the SIA.
Authority for the proposition that section 11 could have been considered in this
instance can be found in the UK High Court decision in London Steam-ship Owners'
Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Spain & Anor," where the Plaintiffs, who were
protection and indemnity insurers, applied to enforce two arbitral awards obtained
pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract of insurance. The arbitral awards
limited the Plaintiffs' liability for an ecological disaster created when a storm caused
a vessel to split in two and sink off the coast of Spain. The ship was carrying 70,000
tonnes of fuel oil and the effects of the pollution spread all the way along the coast
to France. The Defendant States, France and Spain, had refused to participate in the
arbitration proceedings and challenged the substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal.
The Defendant States relied on Section 9(1) of the UK's State Immunity Act
1978 (Cap. 33), which is in pari materia with Section 11 of the SIA. In finding that the
Defendants had waived their immunity by agreeing in writing to arbitration, the
UK High Court held that the purpose of Section 9 was "to ensure that where a State is
30 Id. at IT 19-21.
31 [2013] EWHC 3188 (Comm).
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bound to arbitrate it is also bound to submit to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, to
ensure that the arbitration is effective.""
4. Act of State Doctrine
A. General Approach
The judgment of Maldives Airports was the first time in which the Singapore Court
of Appeal had occasion to consider the act of State doctrine, which has since been
affirmed and further applied by the same court in Maler Foundation.3 In Maldives
Airports, the CA affirmed the formulation in the seminal decision of Underhill v
Hernandez:'
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
between themselves.35
The difference between the State immunity doctrine and the act of State doctrine as
was usefully set out by Rix LJ in Yukos Capital:
As I understand the difference between them, state immunity is a creature of
international law and operates as a plea in bar to the jurisdiction of the national court,
whereas the act of state doctrine is a rule of domestic law which holds the national
court incompetent to adjudicate upon the lawfulness of the sovereign acts of a foreign
state.36
In relation to the approach which the courts should take in relation to the act of
State doctrine, the Singapore Court of Appeal followed the English House of Lords
32 London Steam-ship [2013] EWHC 3188 (Comm), at¶ 140. [Emphasis added]
" The Republic ofPhilippines v Maler [2014] 1 SLR 1389, at ¶ 48.
1 168 US 250 (1897), at 252.
1s Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at ¶ 24. [Emphasis added]
36 Yukos Capital [2013] 3 WLR 1329, at153.
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decision of Attorney-General v Nissan:7
An act of state is something not cognisable by the court: if a claim is made in respect of it,
the court will have to ascertain the facts but if it then appears that the act complained of was an
act of state the court must refuse to adjudicate upon the claim. In such a case the court does
not come to any decision as to the legality or illegality, or the rightness or wrongness,
of the act complained of: the decision is that because it was an act of state the court has
no jurisdiction to entertain a claim in respect of it. This is a very unusual situation and
strong evidence is required to prove that it exists in a particular case.
A few points on the Court's approval of the extract of Attorney-General v Nissan bear
mention. First, the concept of an act of State functions as a jurisdictional and not a
substantive question. Second, the burden of proof for an act of state to be recognised
is high - i.e. the Court must be presented with 'strong evidence,' although the CA
provided no guidance on what constitutes 'strong evidence.' Third, once the Courts
have been presented with a clear case that an act of State exists, it must refuse to
adjudicate on the claim and does not have any residual discretion in this regard.
Fourth, at its literal interpretation, the act of State doctrine aims to prevent courts
from opining on "the legality or illegality, or the rightness or wrongness" of the
act of another State. Put differently, courts should be mindful of passing judgment
on the act only in so far as they relate to the 'propriety,'3 9 the -validity'4 1 or the
'legitimacy' 4' of the act in question. This purpose is therefore narrow and in the
interests of international comity.
By extension, this narrow purpose does not prevent courts from adjudicating a
claim where an act of State is an ancillary concern, and forms the mere background
to the substantive claim to be adjudicated upon.
37 [1970] AC 179, at 237, per Lord Pearson.
38 Maldives Aiports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at¶ 27. [Emphasis added]
39 WestLBAG [201214 SLR 894, at¶¶ 38 & 43.
40 Id. at 139.
41 Id. at¶43.
42 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at 125, citing the passage of J Clarke, Oetjen v Central Leather Company 246
US 297 (1918), at 303-304: The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully
questioned in the courts of another ... rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be re-examined and perhaps condemned by
the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of
nations."
43 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at 1 13.
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B. What is an Act of State?
In relation to the question of what amounts to an act of State, the CA affirmed the
test laid down in Salaman v Secretary of State in Council of India:44 i.e. an act "done in
the exercise of the State's supreme sovereign power" 45 Elaborating on this test, it
cited the following extract from Duke of Brunswick v Ernest Augustus, King of Hanover,
Duke of Cumberland and Teviotdale, in Great Britain and Earl of Armagh, in Ireland
(hereinafter Brunswick):"
If it were a private transaction ... then the law upon which the rights of individuals
may depend, might have been a matter of fact to be inquired into ... But ... if it be a
matter of sovereign authority, we cannot try the fact whether it be right or wrong.
[Emphasis added]
Applying this test, the Singapore Court of Appeal was of the view that the facts of
this case entailed that the dispute "in essence is a private law dispute between
the parties. "a Moreover, given that MACL and the Maldives Government's basis
for taking over the airport was that the contract was void ab initio or frustrated,
which was essentially a matter of contract law.4 Accordingly, it held that the act of
State doctrine did not apply.49 In this regard, the CA's analysis mirrors one of the
limitations of the act of State doctrine articulated by the English Court of Appeal in
Yukos Capital that "as a matter of general international law... there is no immunity for the
state's commercial activities.,50 Whilst the case presents a clear example of a private
dispute, this author questions the CA's adoption of the Brunswick test as this test
has been framed in somewhat didactic terms: i.e. an act is either an act of state or a
private act.
Such dicta leave little room to consider whether or not elements of both sovereign
and private actions can co-exist. E.g., in another dispute concerning the construction
of an airport terminal, Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, a tribunal constituted under the International Chamber
of Commerce considered interim injunctions sought in aid of an arbitration
4 [1906] 1 KB 613, at 121-22.
45 Maldives Airports [2013]2 SLR 449, at 128.
46 (1848) 2 HLC 1; 9 ER 993, at 21-2.
47 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at 1 30.
48 Id. at 130.
4 Id at 130.
5o Yukos Capital [2012] EWCA Civ 855, at ¶92.
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concerning the alleged expropriation of one of the terminals of the Philippine
national airport by the Republic of Philippines.
That Tribunal, in dealing with an argument by the Republic of Philippines that
the act of State doctrine applied, stated:
The Tribunal does not propose to pass judgment upon the validity or invalidity of the
expropriation proceedings in the Philippines ... [t]he only matter which the Tribunal
will determine is whether, in the context of a dispute concerning the validity and
breach of a contract, permitting the Claimant to construct and operate Tenninal 3, the
Respondent should be ordered to give up possession to the Claimant."1
In Maldives Airports, GMIA could have raised a similar arguement that MACL's
demand for repossession of the airport was an act of expropriation and asked the
court to accordingly assess its rights due to the unlawful breach of the concession
agreement. However, the concession agreement in Maldives Airports expressly
provided for the right of the Maldives Government to expropriate the property,
setting out a specific amount of damages as compensation. This appears to be the
reason why GMIA chose instead to insist that the act was not in fact proprietary
expropriation per se, but rather "a gross breach of the Concession Agreement,"
seeking more extensive remedies.52
C. A Mere Factor in Interim Curial Measures?
It therefore follows from the above, and the Court of Appeal's endorsement of
Attorney-General v Nissan, that an act of State would only render a court wholly
incompetent where this act is the precise act over which the Singapore courts are
required to pass judgment. Thus far, this fact pattern has not arisen for consideration
before the Singapore courts. In other words, the narrow application of the act of State
doctrine indicates that it is the limitations of the doctrine that steer its application,
rather than the doctrine itself. [Emphasis added] For this reason, the CA in Maldives
Airports, as obiter, refrained from expressing a definite opinion as to where a possible
future act of State forms the subject of an injunction, whether the wider principle
of judicial abstention or restraint should apply and the court should refrain from
adjudicating on the matter.
51 Order concerning Application for Interim Measures to Maintain Status Quo Ante (Aug. 23, 2006), at %f 42-43, ICC
Case No 126/TE/MW.
52 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at 1 60.
5 Id.at¶ 31.
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The CA merely suggested that the act of state "would inevitably be a factor
which a court will take into consideration when assessing whether an injunction
should be granted in such circumstances."-M As recognised by the CA, the act of State
doctrine is a narrow one as 'strong evidence' is required to prove its existence in
a particular case." Without elaborating on the weight to be given to an act of State
and the requisite criteria of "strong evidence", the comments provided by the Court
of Appeal in Maldives Airports have limited instructive value to future applicants
seeking interim measures which touch on a potential act of a foreign State.
5. Rights Which Are Capable of Being Protected
As a further liminal issue, the Court of Appeal considered the basis on which it
had the power to grant an injunction. It agreed with both parties that such power
was conferred by Section 12A(4) read with sections 12(1)(i) and 12A(2) of the IAA,
which state as follows:
12.(1) Without prejudice to the powers set out in any other provision of this Act and in
the Model Law, an arbitral tribunal shall have powers to make orders or give directions to
any party for:
(i) an interim injunction or any other interim measure.
12A(1) This section shall apply in relation to an arbitration:
(a) to which this Part applies; and
(b) irrespective of whether the place of arbitration is in the territory of Singapore.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) to (6), for the purpose of and in relation to an arbitration
referred to in subsection (1), the High Court or a Judge thereof shall have the same
power of making an order in respect of any of the matters set out in section 12(1)(c) to (i)
as it has for the purpose of and in relation to an action or a matter in the court.
(4) If the case is one of urgency, the High Court or a Judge thereof may, on the
application of a party or proposed party to the arbitral proceedings, make such orders
54 Id. at 1 23 L
55 Id. at T 27.
s6 Cap. 143A, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing.; Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at 1 32.
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under subsection (2) as the High Court or Judge thinks necessary for the purpose of
preserving evidence or assets.
[Emphasis added]
On this basis, the CA concluded that it had the power to make any interim order, not
merely those limited to Anton Piller orders or Mareva injunctions, as long as they
consider the order sought as necessary for the preservation of evidence or assets."7 In
this regard, the CA had to determine whether the following were assets capable of
being preserved under s 12A(4) of the IAA:
(a) the right to be served the appropriate notice under the concession agreement before
termination was effected,
(b) the right under the concession agreement to have any dispute over the entitlements
of the parties under the concession agreement resolved by an arbitral tribunal
before those entitlements were destroyed; and
(c) GMIA's asserted interest in the land on which the airport is situated.
With regards the first set of contractual rights, the CA concluded that contractual
rights were, in theory, capable of being preserved under s 12A(4) of the IAA. The
Court of Appeal was of the view that Parliament intended that the definition of
assets in Cetelem SA v. Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] 1WLR 3555 (hereinafter Cetelem)
would govern the interpretation of s 12A(4) of the IAA. " In Cetelem, Clarke LJ (as he
then was) held that contractual rights could be assets within s 44(3) of the English
Arbitration Act 1996.59 However, His Honour maintained that not all contractual
rights could be protected under s 12A(4) of the IAA, but merely those "which lend
themselves to being preserved or, put another way, those which, if lost, would not
adequately be remediable by an award of damages."6 These contractual rights were
those which could be subject to an order of specific enforcement by the court, such
as the right to purchase shares of what appears to have been an unlisted company,
as a contractual right to purchase such shares would not be available in the open
market.6'
57 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR449, at ¶ 32.
5 Id. TT 36-39.
5 Id. at ¶% 36-37. Section 44(3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (Cap. 23) is as follows:
44 Court powers exercisable in support of arbitral proceedings...
(3) If the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of a party or proposed party to the arbitral proceed-
ings, make such orders as it thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets.
60 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at ¶% 40-43.
61 Idat¶41.
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In the Maldives Airports, there was nothing to suggest that the concession agreement
was one that was specifically enforceable, as the two contractual rights alleged
by GMIA were not rights capable of being preserved under s 12A(4) of the IAA.
Construing them as such would be tantamount to pre-judging GMIA's claim to
carry out and perform the concession agreement, which was the very issue where
the arbitral tribunal had to determine in the substantive arbitration.6 Nevertheless,
the CA was of the view that GMIA's interest in the land on which the airport was
situated was capable of being preserved under sl2A(4) of the IAA.64 GMIA had a
right as a lessee in the land by virtue of clause 2.3.1 of the concession agreement, in
which GMIA was granted the "exclusive right to occupy, use and peacefully enjoy
the Site" for a term of 25 years.65 As will be discussed below, however, the Court
of Appeal still had to consider whether, on a balance of probabilities, an injunction
should be granted.
6. Scope of Interim Relief Sought
Although the Court of Appeal was of the view that it had the power to award an
interim injunction, it did not grant the injunction after assessing where the balance of
convenience lay.66 It applied the well-known balance of convenience test laid down
by Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd,17 which is that the court
should "take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if that course
should ultimately turn out to have been the 'wrong' course.""
The CA opined that the balance of convenience lay in not granting the injunction,
taking the following into account:
(a) damages were an adequate remedy for GMIA in the event that the tribunal
determined that the concession agreement was not void ab initio or frustrated;69
62 Id. at 146.
63 Id. at ¶¶ 46-49.
64 Id. at ¶¶ 50-52.
65 Id.at% 50-51.
66 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at 153.
67 [1975] 2 WLR 316, at 321-2.
68 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at ¶ 53; referring to Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte
Factortame Ltd and Others (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, at 683. [Emphasis added]
69 Maldives Aiports [201312 SLR 449, at ¶1 55-62.
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(b) GMIA did not adduce sufficient evidence that MACL and/or the Maldives
Government would be unable to pay it damages for any losses that the former
might incur if the injunction were not granted; 70 and
(c) the practical problems associated with the enforcement of the injunction.71
Focussing primarily on point (c), the CA considered the following to be practical
problems. First, that courts will not ordinarily grant an injunction requiring parties
to continue working together once it was shown that there was no longer any
willingness to cooperate. Further, those courts will not grant injunctions, either,
which would result in numerous follow-up applications raising issues of compliance
or non-compliance with the injunctions granted.72 Second, the CA considered that
the sheer breadth of the injunction, which would have made it difficult for both
MACL and the Maldives Government (particularly the latter) to have any certainty
of what was required of them in order to ensure that compliance with the terms of
the injunction.3 It bears repetition that the injunction sought to restrain MACL, the
Maldives Government, and their directors, officers, servants or agents from interfering
either directly or indirectly with GMIA's performance of its obligations under the
concession agreement.4
The Court was rightly concerned that a myriad of potential disputes might arise
about whether particular acts involving other agencies of the Maldives Government
were in contravention of the injunction. 5 The CA held that: "An interim injunction
must be certain and should not be granted in terms which leave it to be argued in
contempt proceedings what it does and does not require of the party to whom it is
directed."76
Third, the CA was mindful that the injunction would have affected third parties.
This was due to "the principle that third parties must not aid or abet a breach, or
deliberately frustrate the purpose of an injunction."78 In this case, third parties
comprised "domestic regulators who regulatory functions encompass aspects related
to the operation of the Airport," such as the Maldives Civil Aviation Authority
70 Id. at ¶¶ 63-65.
71Id at-"y 66-7 1.
72 Id. at¶ 66.
73 Id. at T 68.
74 Id. at T 8. [Emphasis added]
7 Id. at 68.
76 Id. at 68; referring to Electronic Applications (Commercial) Ltd v Toubkin and Another [1962] RPC 225, at 227.
n Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at ¶ 69.
78 Id. at ¶ 68, recited fiom STEVEN GEE, COMMERCIAL INJUNCTIONs 4.001 (5th ed. 2004).
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and the Maldivian Department of Immigration and Emigration, 79 as well as other
Maldivian governmental bodies involved in the regulation of transportation, tourism
and even defence." Ultimately, given the potential far-reaching effects on other
Maldivian governmental entities and agencies, the CA held that the uncertainties
which arose was not purely a matter of the drafting of the injunction," and could
not be addressed by rewording the injunction. To this end, the Court was convinced
that such uncertainties were inherent to the very nature of the dispute, being the
governance of relationships over the operation of the national airport of a sovereign
State.82
In refraining from issuing an injunction that would have had consequential
effects on government entities and agencies concerned with the running of the
Maldivian airport, the CA was effectively applying the doctrine of comity, which, as
stated above, forms the basis of non-justiciability inherent to the act of State doctrine,
despite the fact that the Court's finding that this doctrine did not apply in this case.
[Emphasis added] According to the Court, the injunction would have entailed "an
unacceptable degree of supervision in a foreign land," over which it had little power
to enforce.Y
It may be argued that these so-called 'practical problems' are indeed invocations
of the act of State doctrine. As it is evident from the analysis above, the CA based
much of its perception of the injunction's potential impact on third parties, particularly
the fact that it would be inevitable for third parties to be affected given that this
concerned the operation of a national airport. Support for this view may be found
in the ICC Case of Philippine International Air Terminals, which has been mentioned
above. In that case, the Claimant, Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc,
sought interim injunctions which, if granted, would have had the effect of reverting
matters to the status quo before the expropriation.84 To this end, it sought orders
restraining the Republic of Philippines from altering, operating or removing
the terminal; from assigning or bidding out the right to possess, lease, manage
or operate the said terminal; from entering into any management contract, etc;
from entering into sales contracts, lease contracts, etc; from interfering with and
influencing the breach of the contractual relationship between the Claimant and a
7 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at ¶ 69.
80 Id. at¶ 70.
8 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id at T71.
84 Supra note 51, at In 3 & 62.
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third party and from planning or performing any other acts aimed at dispossessing
or requiring from the Claimant documents, plans and codes."
In dismissing most of the interim orders sought, the ICC Tribunal was of the
view that such orders would have the effect of determining, at the interim stage, that
the Claimant was entitled to specific performance of the contract which formed the
subject matter of the dispute."
Such a finding would be premature if, at the end of the arbitration, the Claimant
was only found to be entitled to damages.87 This finding is similar to that of the
Court of Appeal in Maldives Airports. But there is one crucial difference. Unlike
the CA, the ICC Tribunal was of the view that it was important for the Claimant
to continue to have access to the airport terminal in order to present its case 8 and
to have a legitimate interest in possessing and occupying the terminal in order to
preserve necessary evidence for the arbitration, on the basis that "irreparable or
substantial harm will be caused if the order is not made.""
As such, the Tribunal ordered the Philippines Government and "its officers
and agents" to "cease occupation and give up possession of [the terminal] and not
to obstruct the Claimant in entering into occupation and taking up possession of
[the terminal]."91 It is clear from the reasoning of the ICC Tribunal in Philippine
International Air Terminals that interim relief may be granted where the applicant is
able to demonstrate a real need for interim relief, e.g., regarding the preservation of
evidence. Such a request for interim relief was worded in clear and unambiguous
terms, i.e., to cease occupation of the terminal and not obstruct the Claimant from
entering into occupation and taking up possession of the terminal, as opposed to
the wide-ranging order sought in Maldives Airports, which was that the MACL and
the Maldives Government were to be restrained from interfering "either directly or
indirectly with the performance by the Respondent (GMIA) of its obligations under the
Concession Agreement." 92
85 Id. at 62.
86 Id. at 63.
87 Id.
88 Maldives Airports [2013] 2 SLR 449, at¶ 41.
89 Supra note 51, at¶ 59.
90 Id. at 64.
91 Id.
92 Id. at ¶ 8. [Emphasis added]
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7. Conclusion
The Court of Appeal's analysis in Maldives Airports has been brought into sharp
focus by recent decisions of a Singapore-seated arbitral tribunal in favour of GMIA.
Undoubtedly strengthened, in part, by the reasoning in Maldives Airports, the
tribunal had issued its initial award in June 2014, concluding that the concession
agreement was valid and binding, and that the Maldives Government and MACL
had unlawfully repudiated the contract. The tribunal found that both were liable for
damages to GMIA. In February 2016, the tribunal added this damages payable by to
GMIAL will also include all the sums owed by GMIA to the Singapore-based project
lenders Axis Bank Singapore Pte Ltd under the concession agreement.9
The decision in Maldives Airports reaffirms that courts in Singapore have the
power to assist with providing interim relief in support of arbitration, and that the
mere presence of a State or State-linked party will not necessarily foreclose such
relief. Although the CA made clear that it will not adjudicate upon matters that
turn on the legality of a foreign sovereign act, Singapore courts will follow English
case law and require that a high standard of proof be discharged to demonstrate
that a purported act of State is evidenced. In this case, the CA considered that the
dispute was a "private law dispute" involving "private law remedies." [Emphasis added]
Further, it considered that since MACL and the Maldivian Government were
claiming that the concession agreement was void ab initio or frustrated, those were
purely matters of contract law.
Yet the practical considerations that were ultimately taken into account by
the CA are telling and appear to be an unspoken allusion to the doctrine. In due
course, the act of State should be seen, as the English Court of Appeal has noted, as
a collection of doctrines, rather than a simple dichotomy between public acts and
private exceptions. Where sovereign States are concerned, the line separating both
is thin. Courts should be guided by the general concept of judicial restraint within
the plurality of the act of State doctrine(s). Decisions should turn on the context
and effect of passing judgment on the alleged act in question instead of a seemingly
binary classification, lest the 'silhouette' of the act of State vanishes.
93 C. Simson, India's GMR Handed Win in Maldives Airport Arbitration, LAw 360, Feb. 24, 2016, available at http://
www.1aw360.com/articles/763023/india-s-gmr-handed-win-in-maldives-airport-arbitration (last visited on May 18,
2016).
Digest 251

